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The invitation to disaster is in persisting with a status quo in
which public officials toss and turn at night, mindful of how ex-
posed we remain, while the general population goes about their
lives oblivious to the perils that confront them.'
+ Dean and Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law; J.D., Rutgers Uni-
versity School of Law, Newark (1994); Ph.D. (Organic Chemistry), Rutgers University,
Newark (1988). This article supplements the author's previous article on the regulation of
household chemicals. Leticia M. Diaz, Homeland Security, Pesticide Regulation and
Common Household Chemicals: Are We Adequately Protecting All Our Sources?, 14 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 211 (2003). Deep appreciation to Kathryn Shaw for her excellent work in
researching and editing this article.
1. STEPHEN FLYNN, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE 16 (2004).
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Tokyo's September 11th occurred on March 20, 1995, when sarin gas
was released in five coordinated attacks on several lines of the Tokyo
subway.2 Twelve people were killed and more than 5500 were injured.3
Where did the perpetrators obtain the gas? How vulnerable were
Japan's chemical facilities? Are U.S. chemical facilities equally suscepti-
ble to terrorist infiltration? Is the United States ready for the unknown
when it has been unable to respond rapidly to the known?4 Numerous
state and federal agencies were responsible for disaster recovery response
after Hurricane Katrina.5 Yet despite the bravado put forth by many of
these agencies, response was slow and victims died or went without ade-
quate assistance for weeks.6 The response was grossly inadequate, not-
withstanding the advance warning that such a disaster was inevitable.7 Is
the United States prepared for a chemical disaster without warning, such
as an attack on our chemical facilities by terrorists? Is the United States
prepared for a chemical attack even with warning?
I. INTRODUcTION
A nationwide study conducted shortly after September 11th showed
that "agencies have bolstered their preparedness efforts, but substantial
variation exists in the approach to preparedness and the preparedness
needs of local agencies in small and large counties."8 From this study, it is
clear that federal legislation is needed to unify the states in their prepar-
edness for such an attack.9 Senator Joseph Lieberman, discussing nuclear
and chemical security, stated "that despite the eye opening effects of the
9/11 attacks, 'somehow we have not yet protected one of our greatest
2. Japan Econ. Newswire, Japan Marks 11th Anniversary of Sarin Attack, TMCNET,
Mar. 19, 2006, http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2006/03/19/1471746.htm. The attack, com-
mitted by the AUM Shinrikyo cult, exposed Japanese citizens on five trains on three sub-
way lines to deadly sarin gas. Id.
3. Id.
4. See John McLaughlin's "One on One" (Federal News Service radio broadcast Oct.
14, 2005), available at http://mclaughlin.com/library/moo-transcript.asp?id=141. The fed-
eral government, aware of the incoming Hurricane Katrina, failed to adequately prepare
for its landing and to respond to the destruction that followed. See id.
5. See id. (discussing the need for a response by not only FEMA but also by the
National Guard, the state police, the local health department, and the local environmental
protection departments).
6. See id. (noting that the government could not get water to those on roofs or gen-
erators to local hospitals because of a lack of communication between first responders).
7. Id.
8. RAND CORP., How PREPARED ARE STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
FOR TERRORISM? 1 (2004), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/researchbriefs/2005/
RAND RB9093.pdf.
9. See id. at 2.
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vulnerabilities."" 0 Senator Lieberman's perhaps prophetic acknowledg-
ment of a potential terrorist attack notes a major area of homeland secu-
rity upon which Congress has thus far been slow to act. Although the
government has long since recognized the chemical industry's potentiality
as a terrorist target, few federal regulations impose security require-
ments." Are legislators any closer to securing one of the nation's most
vulnerable targets?
This article examines the need for federal regulation of the chemical
industry, specifically chemical facilities, and the legislation that came be-
fore the 109th Congress. Part II discusses the various reasons supporting
increased regulation of the chemical industry. It explains the vulnerabil-
ity of the industry to terrorist attack and the likelihood that any response
to such an attack would be entirely insufficient. Part III presents a review
of the previous federal regulations that Congress has proposed, as well as
the legislation that currently regulates a small portion of the chemical
industry. Part IV analyzes current bills before the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives and the U.S. Senate. Part V discusses state legislation address-
ing chemical site security, focusing on the principal places of business for
industry leaders. Part VI discusses the newly enacted-and inadequate-
Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007. Part VII recommends a
unified legislation to guide the entire chemical industry by one set stan-
dard.
II. THE INCREASING NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO ENSURE THE
SECURITY OF CHEMICAL FACILITIES
Many believe the chemical industry is the "Achilles heel in our nation's
infrastructure. 12 While daily news broadcasts suggest that our focus is on
national security and increasing our protection, we are actually removing
more assets from our security. 3 State and local governments are laying
off emergency responders and law enforcement officers and tightening
their budgets for homeland protection. 4 The U.S. Coast Guard and cus-
10. Leon Hamerling, Homeland Security Stocks: Integrated Security Providers ECSI
and GVIS Positioned to Benefit from New Senate Chemical Plant Security Bill, BUS. WIRE,
Jan. 5, 2006, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE file (quoting Senator Lieberman
on the introduction in the Senate of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005).
The New York Times has noted that just one attack on a chlorine tank could cause more
than 17,000 deaths and more than 100,000 injuries. Id.
11. Marta Lawrence, A Clear Shot at Chemical Plant Security, SECURITY MGMT., July
2006 at 36, 36; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the Maritime Transportation Security
Act (MTSA), the Clean Air Act, and other statutes addressing chemical security).
12. Peter Mayberry & Jessica Franken, Chemical Plant Security Legislation Moves
Forward... Again, NONWOVENS INDUSTRY, Aug. 1, 2006, available at http://www.security
infowatch.com/online/standards-and-legislation/9274SIW320.
13. See FLYNN, supra note 1, at 1-2.
14. See id. at 1-2.
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toms officials are receiving more responsibilities but losing force in num-
bers to meet growing security demands.15 In addition, the burden on
states for funding their own homeland security programs is growing;
however, the looming deficits in state budgets are making actual im-
provements in such programs difficult.
6
Since September 11, 2001, both the Department of Justice and the Di-
rector of the CIA have warned that the threat to our chemical facilities,
by al Qaeda or otherwise, is "real and credible.",17 The Brookings Institu-
tion estimated in 2002 that the extent of potential casualties for an attack
on chemical facilities ranks second only to that from biological and
atomic attacks." The impact of an attack on a chemical facility can be felt
not only in the immediate loss of lives but also in the prolonged effects on
the local and regional economy and environment.' 9 The Department of
Homeland Security's Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan
indicates that "a failure in one sector will have a significant impact on the
ability of another sector to perform necessary functions."2 ° With the $550
billion chemical industry employing over 900,000 people, one terrorist
attack could cause far-reaching market instability.2' The chemical sector
accounts for ten percent of all exports, and chemicals touch ninety-six
percent of all manufactured goods.2 The interdependent nature of indus-
15. Id. at 42-43.
16. Id. at 53.
17. See Chemical Attack on America: How Vulnerable Are We?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 16-17 (2005) [here-
inafter Chemical Attack Hearing] (testimony of John B. Stephenson, Director, Natural
Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office).
18. Id. at 67 (prepared statement of John B. Stephenson) (citing THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION, PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
(2002)). Richard A. Falkenrath, a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution testified
before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security that "[tioxic-by-inhalation industrial
chemicals present a mass-casualty terrorist potential rivaled only by improvised nuclear
devices, certain acts of bioterrorism, and the collapse of large, occupied buildings." De-
partment of Homeland Security: The Road Ahead: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Home-
land Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 114-15 (2005) (prepared statement of
Richard A. Falkenrath, Visiting Fellow, The Brookings Institution).
19. Chemical Attack Hearing, supra note 17, at 67-68. An attack on a chemical facility
disrupts the local and regional economy because of the symbiotic nature of the industry.
Id. For example, the agricultural and pharmaceutical industries as well as drinking water
treatment facilities are dependent on the chemical industry for survival. Id.
20. Id. at 68. Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, rail service was slowed in
some areas due to a fear of an intentional release of chlorine or other hazardous chemicals
that the railcars were transporting. Id.
21. H.R. 5695, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the H. Comm.
on Homeland Security, 109th Cong. 34 (2006) [hereinafter Facility Anti-Terrorism Act
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tries, together constructing a critical infrastructure, became apparent
from the attacks of September 11th, 2001. Immediately following the
attacks on September 11th, the federal government ceased all aviation
travel and slowed the influx of goods into our ports.2' The return to a
normal trade flow, both domestically and internationally, was dawdling,
as the government tried to increase the number of assessments of people
and goods entering the United States.24
There are currently over 15,000 facilities in the United States that
manufacture, use, or store large amounts of chemicals.23 Of these 15,000
facilities, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified
263400 facilities as possible hazards. 6 The hazards posed by chemical facili-
ties are either a direct attack on a facility or the use of inside employees
to procure chemical materials that may be used as weapons or to make
weapons." Trends in terrorism have shown that although the number of
terrorist attacks has decreased from the early 1980's, the overall number
of those injured or killed has increased.28 Essentially, terrorists are look-
ing for the most effect for a single effort. One expert on national security
has deemed a direct attack on a chemical facility the equivalent of a
"poor man's atomic bomb., 29
A direct attack on a chemical facility provides the opportunity for a
single attack causing a large number of casualties. For example, explod-
ing a nuclear reactor would spread radiation over countless miles of sur-
rounding landscape. Certain key chemical components of nerve gas or
sarin, once stolen, can be easily transported and used to kill thousands in
chemical attacks across the country. A report issued by an interest group
stated that "more than 41 million Americans live within range of a toxic
cloud that could result from a chemical accident at a facility located in
23. See, e.g., FLYNN, supra note 1, at 9; K. Lamar Walters, III, Comment, Industry on
Alert: Legal and Economic Ramifications of the Homeland Security Act on Maritime
Commerce, 30 TUL. MAR. L.J. 311, 321 (2006).
24. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 9-10.
25. See Chemical Attack Hearing, supra note 17, at 1 (statement of Sen. Susan M.
Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs).
26. Stew Magnuson, Chemical Security Legislation Moves Slowly, NAT'L DEF., May
2006, at 11.
27. LINDA-JO SCHIEROW, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CHEMICAL FACILITY
SECURITY, 2 (2006).
28. Id. In the 1980s there were only 23 fatalities and 105 injuries as a result of 267
attacks, compared to 182 fatalities and 1932 injuries in the 1990s as a result of 60 attacks.
COUNTERTERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT AND WARNING UNIT, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1999 16 (1999), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror99.pdf.
29. Mayberry & Franken, supra note 12. It is estimated that at least 140,000 people
died as a result of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6,
1945. Nagasaki's Mayor Slams U.S. for Nuke Arsenal, Fox NEWS, Aug. 9, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,165148,00.html.
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their home zip code."3 A study conducted by the Surgeon General for
the U.S. Army found that a chemical release as a result of a terrorist at-
tack could affect more than 2.4 million people.3
In the early 1990s, direct attacks were attempted overseas on plants
producing fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and pesticides, all in heavily popu-
lated areas of Croatia.32 Terrorists have also been able to procure chemi-
cals through their employment within a chemical plant.33 The 1993 World
Trade Center bombers reported that they were able to order the chemi-
cals used in a vehicle bomb by becoming employed as chemical engineers
and acquiring company stationery. 4
Investigative reporting has further exposed chemical site vulnerabilities
to the public.35 Following a Pittsburgh Tribune-Review report, 60 Minutes
tried to see how security at chemical facilities really stacked up.36 60
Minutes visited a number of heavily populated cities.37 At a Los Angeles
facility, less than a mile from a school and a day care center, reporters
discovered that although the facility's front gate was well-manned, a gate
in the rear was left unguarded and easily accessible.8 At a Houston facil-
30. Schierow, supra note 27, at 8 (quoting ALLISON LAPLANTE, U.S. PUB. INTEREST
RESEARCH GROUP, Too CLOSE TO HOME: A REPORT ON CHEMICAL ACCIDENT RISKS
IN THE UNITED STATES (1998)).
31. Schierow, supra note 27, at 10 (citing Eric Pianin, Study Assesses Risk of Attack on
Chemical Plant, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2002, at A8). Included in the 2.4 million people are
those who would seek some medical treatment after an attack on a large facility in a heav-
ily populated area. Id. (quoting Army Recants Attack Estimates, CHEMICAL WK., May 22,
2002, at 38).
32. See id. at 4. On August 6, 1995, Serb aircraft fired 57mm missiles at a chemical
plant in Croatia. BBC, Official Statements and Actions: Defence Ministry Condemns Bos-
nian Serb Air Raids, BBC SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Aug. 9, 1995, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCMIR File. The Croatian Defence Ministry considered such an
attack international terrorism because attacking a chemical facility "'could cause an exten-
sive ecological catastrophe, thus endangering human lives as well as polluting the envi-
ronment."' Id.
33. See Schierow, supra note 27, at 4.
34. Id. In another example of vulnerability, shortly after the attacks of September 11,
2001, a warehouse in Florida reported that 400 pounds of methyl bromide, a chemical
causing severe respiratory problems if released into the air, was stolen during a two-hour
period when the warehouse was unguarded. Joseph A. Siegel, Terrorism and Environ-
mental Law: Chemical Facility Site Security vs. Right-to-Know?, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J.
339, 368 (2003).
35. See, e.g., U.S. Plants: Open to Terrorists, CBS NEWS, June 13, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/11/13/60minutes/main583528.shtml.
36. See id.; see also Carl Prine, Chemicals Pose Risks Nationwide, PITTSBURGH
TRIBUNE-REVIEW, May 5, 2002, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/
pittsburghtrib/s_69664.html.
37. See U.S. Plants: Open to Terrorists, supra note 35.
38. Id.
1176 [Vol. 56:1171
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ity, a terrorist could enter the facility unquestioned. 39 The crew also
found that gates were unlocked and that tanks housing deadly chemicals
were left unprotected.4 Months after the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review first
published an expos6 on lax security at chemical plants, the 60 Minutes
crew accompanied the Tribune-Review reporter on a revisit to one of the
facilities, and found that they were still able to just walk in unques-
tioned.4' They were inside the facility long enough to get to the most
dangerous chemicals.42 If they had been terrorists rather than reporters,
they could have released the chemicals.43 Most of the employees just
waved and greeted the crew as they walked through the facility unes-
corted."4 After the crew had left the property, they were finally stopped
and asked their purpose for being at the facility.45 The 60 Minutes crew
and the Tribune-Review reporter were only given a twenty-five dollar
citation for trespassing. '
Another study also shows the shortcomings of security in the chemical
sector. In 1999, a study conducted by the Department of Health and
Human Services Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry indi-
cated that "security at chemical plants [in two communities] ranged from
fair to very poor., 47 The study found security vulnerabilities such as unat-
tended chemical barges and rail cars containing chemicals parked near
residential areas.4 Investigations such as the 60 Minutes special report
and the Department of Health and Human Services study expose the
weaknesses in our nation's plan for safeguarding dangerous chemicals
from terrorist acquisition.
One recent accident at a chemical plant in Apex, North Carolina shows
the effects that an attack on only a small facility might have.49 On Octo-
ber 6, 2006, a chemical fire at an EQ (Environmental Quality) Industries
facility, formerly responsible for housing and preparing hazardous waste
39. Id. Carl Prine of the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review and CBS News correspondent
Steve Croft, while discussing the appearance of gates and fences, noted that "an intruder








47. JOSEPH L. HUGHART & MARK M. BASHOR, AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES
AND DISEASE REGISTRY, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., INDUSTRIAL
CHEMICALS AND TERRORISM (1999), available at http://www.mapcruzin.com/scruztri/
docs/cep1118992.htm.
48. Id.
49. See Ryan Parry, 17,000 Flee Chemical Blast Town, THE MIRROR, Oct. 7, 2006,
available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/archive/tm-method=full %26objectid=17888063%
26siteid=89520-name-page.html.
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for disposal, caused chlorine to billow into the air. ° After being alerted
by a reverse 911 system,5 approximately 17,000 local residents in the
small town, about half of the total population, were required to evacuate
for more than a day. 2 For a while after the fire started, a local resident
driving by the fire stated that there were "no fire officials, no police offi-
cers and no warning signs that there were chemicals and hazardous waste
in the vicinity."53  Forty-four people, including first responders, were
taken to the emergency room after experiencing shortness of breath and
nausea.14 EQ Industries had been fined a number of times in past years,
including a fine for improperly housing their chemicals.5 These fines, as
well as most current legislation, are of no avail in the protection and secu-
rity of our nation's chemical facilities.
Although lacking authority to enforce legislation, the DHS has under-
taken a number of voluntary efforts. 6 DHS currently provides training
programs, including simulated attack programs, to security officers and
first responders. 7 DHS also conducts vulnerability assessments at high-
risk facilities and offers guidance to the relevant state and local govern-
58ments on options for reducing the vulnerabilities at those sites. In addi-
tion, DHS operates a center that produces day-to-day threat updates to
the chemical industry.59 The chemical industry, to further coordination
50. Id.; see also Chemical Fire Evacuation Over: Hazardous Waste Plant Blaze Chased
Thousands from Their Homes, MSNBC, Oct. 7, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/15150819/; Sarah Ovaska, Toby Coleman & Josh Shaffer., Thousands Flee Apex Fire,
THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 6,2006, at Al.
51. Ovaska, Coleman & Shaffer, supra note 50, at Al. A reverse 911 system is a com-
puter that will call the phone numbers of citizens located within a specified geographic
area and then play a pre-recorded message. See News Release, Reverse 911 Releases New
Version of its Interactive Notification Solution (Jan. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.reverse9l1.comb220fe05c0_sites/www.reverse9ll.com/files/REVERSE%2091
1%20Releases%20New%20Version%20-%20Jan%2024,%202006.pdf.
52. Chemical Fire Evacuation Over, supra note 50; Ovaska, Coleman & Shaffer, supra
note 50, at Al.
53. Thomasi McDonald, An Eye to the Fire, an Ear to the Air, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 7, 2006, at All.
54. See ABC Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast Oct. 6, 2006), avail-
able at 2006 WLNR 17368869; Chemical Fire Evacuation Over, supra note 50.
55. ABC's Good Morning America, supra note 54; Chemical Fire Evacuation Over,
supra note 50.
56. Chemical Attack Hearing, supra note 17, at 17 (testimony of John B. Stephenson,
Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office);
see also Larry Pearl, NIPP Finalized as New Chemical Security Bill Introduced, PESTICIDE
& ToxIc CHEMICAL NEWS, July 3, 2006, at 4 (discussing the final version of DHS's Na-
tional Infrastructure Protection Plan and the planned release of sector specific plans).
57. See Chemical Attack Hearing, supra note 17, at 72 (prepared statement of John B.
Stephenson).
58. Id.; Pearl, supra note 56, at 4.
59. Pearl, supra note 56, at 4.
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with DHS, created the Chemical Sector Council in 2004 as an effort to
promote the "sharing of information about ... vulnerabilities,... poten-
tial protective measures and best practices. ' 6°
DHS currently relies on a "patchwork" of voluntary initiatives.6 , For
example, facilities that are members of the American Chemistry Council
62(ACC) are required to implement the Responsible Care Security Code.
This code "prioritize[es] every facility by risk[,] assesses vulnerabilities[,]
implement[s] security enhancements[, and] verif[ies] the implementation
of physical security measures, using third parties that are credible within
the local community, such as first responders or law enforcement offi-
cials., 63 While ACC members account for eighty-five percent of the pro-
duction of chemicals in the United States, the majority of the chemical
industry only uses or stores chemicals. 64
One DHS official commented that "[w]hile most companies have been
eager to cooperate with the department, it has become clear the entirely
voluntary efforts of these companies alone will not sufficiently address
security for the entire sector." '65 Voluntary efforts have been found in-
adequate, especially among smaller companies, because smaller compa-
nies lack the knowledge and funds to properly address security vulner-
abilities.66 Although "[tierrorism is simply too cheap, too available, and
too tempting ever to be totally eradicated," 67 a unified legislation is now
60. Chemical Attack Hearing, supra note 17, at 72-73 (prepared statement of John B.
Stephenson). In April 2005, the Chemical Sector Council consisted of sixteen prominent
associations, such as the American Chemistry Council (ACC), the National Petrochemical
and Refiners Association (NPRA), and the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers
Association (SOCMA). Id. at 73 & n.10. The council is charged with aiding DHS in its
efforts to reduce the risks to the chemical sector. Id. at 72.
61. Mayberry & Franken, supra note 12.
62. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act Hearing, supra note 21, at 35 (prepared
statement of Martin J. Durbin). In 2004, the members of the American Chemistry Council
operated approximately one thousand facilities subject to the Clean Air Act's requirement
to produce risk management plans. Combating Terrorism: Chemical Plant Security: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. On National Security, Emerging Threats and International Rela-
tions of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 108th Cong. 65 [hereinafter Chemical Plant
Security Hearing] (prepared statement of John Stephenson, Director, Natural Resources
and Environment, U.S. General Accounting Office).
63. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act Hearing, supra note 21, at 35 (prepared
statement of Martin J. Durbin).
64. Id.
65. Mayberry & Franken, supra note 12.
66. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY: DHS IS TAKING
STEPS TO ENHANCE SECURITY AT CHEMICAL FACILITIES, BUT ADDITIONAL
AUTHORITY IS NEEDED 40 (2006) [hereinafter DHS IS TAKING STEPS], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06150.pdf; see also Misty Edgecomb, Schumer: Chemical
Facilities Lacking Security, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., July 25, 2006, at 4B,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ROCHDC File.
67. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 59.
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required to ensure security for the chemical sector and limit the effects of
terrorism on our nation. Even though a number of attempts have been
made to pass legislation regulating security in the chemical industry,
every attempt to date has failed.
III. PAST FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS AT CHEMICAL FACILITY
SECURITY AND CURRENT INADEQUATE GUIDING REGULATIONS
A. Past Federal Legislative Attempts at Chemical Facility Security
Shortly after September 11th, 2001, Senator Jon Corzine of New Jersey
introduced the Chemical Security Act of 2001.68 The Act, if passed,
would have placed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the• •69
lead role as its administrator. The stated purpose of the Act was to
"protect the public against the threat of chemical attacks" by requiring
70the use of inherently safer technology and increased security measures.
Under the Act, the EPA would be responsible for determining which of
the 15,000 facilities required to submit Risk Management Plan (RMP)
reports under the Clean Air Act constitute high-risk facilities.71 Factors
such as "population density" and "proximity of other critical infrastruc-
ture" would be considered when determining whether a plant is a high-
risk facility.72 Each high-risk facility then would conduct vulnerability
assessments 73 and prepare response plans to improve security measures
68. Chemical Security Act of 2001, S. 1602, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced on Octo-
ber 31, 2001 by Jon Corzine). Jon Corzine is the current Governor of New Jersey. He
began his term as Governor in January of 2006, after serving as a U.S. Senator from 2001
until 2006. State of New Jersey, Office of the Governor, About the Governor, http://www.
state.nj.us/governor/about/ (last visited July 12, 2007).
69. S. 1602 § 3(2).
70. S. 1602 preamble, § 2(3)(A)(ii), (C).
71. S. REP. No. 107-342, at 4 (2002).
72. Id.; see also S. 1602 § 4(a)(2)(A)-(F). It appears that these factors are used to
narrow down the 15,000 facilities to those facilities that, if attacked, would have the largest
impact based on either population or amount of chemicals or type of chemicals. S. REP.
No. 107-452, at 6.
73. S. REP. NO. 107-342, at 4. In November of 2002, the National Institute of Justice
released a report discussing a methodology of conducting vulnerability assessments.
NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, A METHOD TO ASSESS THE VULNERABILITY OF U.S.
CHEMICAL FACILITIES 1 (2002). Under the proposed risk-based analysis, "risk is a func-
tion of the severity of consequences of an undesired event, the likelihood of adversary
attack, and the likelihood of adversary success in causing the undesired event." Id. at 2.
The method is a twelve-step process involving a facilitator, corporate management, and a
site survey team. Id. at 2-5.
The first step, screening, is used to determine whether a vulnerability assessment is
necessary. Id. at 3, 6. This step requires a facilitator or corporate manager to look at the
possible dangerous events, such as an off-site release or an attack on a facility, the number
of people that could be affected, and the importance of the facility to the critical infrastruc-
ture. Id. If the facility requires an assessment, then at the second step the facilitator cre-
1180 [Vol. 56:1171
Chemical Homeland Security, Fact or Fiction?
and implement safer technology. 4 As an enforcement measure, the bill
also would establish civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance. 5
After the Chemical Security Act of 2001 failed in the 107th Congress,
76
Senator Corzine again proposed legislation to protect the public against
the threat of chemical attacks.77 On January 14, 2003, Senator Corzine
introduced the Chemical Security Act of 2003 . This legislation was al-
most identical to the legislation introduced in the 107th Congress and still
contained provisions requiring the implementation of inherently safer
technology.79 Interest groups and trade associations rallied against the
bill, and again it was defeated.80
As a result of this defeat, Senator James Inhofe introduced the Chemi-
cal Facility Security Act of 2003, a bill that was more "industry
ates a project design that encompasses the needs of the facility, the team to accomplish the
project, and the necessary resources. Id. The third step requires characterizing the facility
through the use of blueprints, site surveys, process descriptions, and the risk management
plan. Id. at 3-4, 7. The next step is to derive a severity level from one to four for each
potential undesired event. Id. at 12. At security level one, the highest level, the facility
will experience major property damage, environmental damage, and public and worker
fatalities in the event of an attack. Id. at 13. At security level four, an accidental or in-
tended release will have no impact outside the facility. Id.
The fifth step is to assess and define possible threats. Id. This process requires the site
team to describe the possible threats, the actions that the threatening groups could take,
their motives, and capabilities. Id. The method recommends that teams look at threats
from insiders as well as threats from the outside. Id. at 14. The threats are then prioritized
at step six. Id. at 16.
Next, at step seven, the site team assesses the current protective measures at the site.
Id. The method advocates utilizing multiple security measures together and including
mitigating measures in case of failure. Id. at 17-19. The eighth step is a chemical facility
walk-through to allow the team to verify the previous work of the facilitator in the prior
steps. Id. at 20. Next, the team analyzes the effectiveness of the system, including physical
protection provided by fencing or limited paths, protection provided by personnel, and
protection of process controls. Id. at 20-24. After assessing the current protection, at step
ten the team analyzes the risks that exist and then makes recommendations to further
reduce the risk. Id. at 24-26. Finally, the team prepares a report for corporate manage-
ment to implement suggestions from the assessment. Id. at 27.
74. S. REP. No. 107-342, at 4.
75. S. 1602 § 7.
76. The Chemical Security Act of 2001 failed as a result of heavy opposition from a
well-funded chemical industry. In particular, the American Chemistry Council opposed
the 2001 legislation because it forced chemical facilities to implement inherently safer
technology. See U.S. Plants Open to Terrorists, supra note 35.
77. Chemical Security Act of 2003, S. 157, 108th Cong. (2003).
78. Id.
79. Compare id. § 2(4)(A)(i)-(ii), with S. 1602§ 2(3)(A)(11).
80. See FLYNN, supra note 1, at 119. Those affected, including chemical facilities,
manufacturers, and the agricultural industry, opposed requirements to use inherently safer
technologies at high-risk facilities. Id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.B (further discuss-
ing the industry's reaction to the inherently safer technology requirements).
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friendly." 81 Unlike the previous bill, new legislation required the DHS to
take a leading role in administration.82 Like its predecessor, the Chemical
Facility Security Act also would have required assessments of the vulner-
ability of each facility to a "terrorist release." ' Based on the results of
the assessments, facilities would have been required to submit a site secu-
rity plan to the DHS.84 This plan was required to include security meas-
ures to reduce vulnerabilities85 by describing improvements to equipment
and site layout.86 DHS would also have been required to submit threat
information for each facility to aid the facility in its assessment. 
8
The Chemical Facility Security Act permitted facilities to petition DHS
to recognize their specific procedures already in use and recognized by
other state and federal agencies. 88 In determining the adequacy of vul-
nerability assessments and security standards, DHS would consider the
nature and quantity of chemical substances on-site,89 the extent of poten-
tial injury in case of a terrorist attack9° and the likelihood that a facility
would be attacked.9' All information obtained in the process, with certain
limited exceptions, would be exempt from disclosure to the public,92 and
unauthorized disclosures would result in the imposition of criminal and
civil penalties.93 In addition, a chemical facility would be subject to ad-
ministrative penalties94 for a failure to comply with the Act and the orders
of the Secretary, as well as to civil action in the U.S. District Courts, pos-
sibly resulting in either injunctive relief or a $50,000 civil penalty for each
day the facility is not in compliance. 9' This industry-friendly Act failed to
address inherently safer technology and did not preempt any other fed-
eral or state law.96 As its predecessors had, this bill also fizzled in the Sen-
ate and failed to pass.97
81. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 119; see generally The Chemical Facilities Security Act of
2003, S. 994, 108th Cong. (2003).
82. Compare S. 994 § 3(B)(2). with S. 1602 § 3(2).
83. S. 994 § 4(a)(1)(A); see also supra note 73 (discussing of vulnerability assess-
ments).
84. S. 994 at § 4(a)(1)(C).
85. Id. § 4(a)(3)(A)(i).
86. Id. § 4(a)(3)(B).
87. Id. § 4(a)(4).
88. Id. § 4(c)(2)(A).
89. Id. § 4(e)(2).
90. Id. § 4(e)(3).
91. Id. § 4(e)(1)-(3).
92. Id. § 4(i)(1).
93. Id. § 4(i)(3).
94. Id. § 8(b).
95. Id. § 8(a).
96. See id. § 10.
97. See Democratic Policy Comm., The Reality Behind the Rhetoric on Homeland
Security: Bush Administration and Senate Republicans Have Compiled a Dismal Record
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B. Current Inadequate Guiding Regulations
Various other congressional enactments affect the implementation of
security efforts within the chemical industry." However, the number of
facilities covered by these acts are only a small percentage of the over
15,000 facilities. For example, the Public Health Security and Bioterror-
ism Response Act of 2002 "requires community water systems serving
more than 3,300 people to perform vulnerability analyses of their facili-
ties." 1°° Apparently, terrorists' contamination of the water of communi-
ties with fewer than 3,300 people is not a sufficient security risk to our
government. Further, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
(MTSA) currently requires the 238 maritime chemical facility owners and
operators subject to regulation to conduct vulnerability assessments of
certain facilities and to develop security plans and measures to mitigate
these vulnerabilities.' These, and similar acts, fail to comprehensively
address the danger of attacks against U.S. chemical facilities and are but
mere fallacies cushioning an unwarranted sense of national security.
Other legislation broadly calls for safety and protective measures but
fails to provide specific and adequate guidelines and solutions to home-
land protection.1°2 "Statutes such as the Occupational Safety and Health
Act... the Clean Air Act, and the Right-to-Know Act impose safety and
emergency response requirements on chemical facilities that may inciden-
tally reduce the likelihood and mitigate the consequences of terrorist
attacks;" however, these statutes do not include vulnerability assessments
or measures to address problems that would be identified by such an as-
sessment. The Clean Air Act requires facilities handling more than a
threshold amount of certain governmentally-identified and regulated
hazardous materials "to prepare and implement a risk management plan
to detect and prevent or minimize accidental releases." 14 Plans include
(Sept. 14, 2004), http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/dpc-new.cfm?docname=fs-108-2-240
(indicating that Senator Inhofe's bill was never called to a floor vote after it passed a com-
mittee in October of 2003).
98. See infra notes 100-114 and accompanying text.
99. Chemical Plant Security Hearing, supra note 62, at 62 (prepared statement of John
Stephenson) (noting that the requirements would apply to only twenty-one percent of
facilities).
100. Chemical Attack Hearing, supra note 17, at 70 (prepared statement of John B.
Stephenson).
101. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 70102-70104 (West Supp. 2007); see also id. at 71-77.
102. See infra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
103. Chemical Plant Security Hearing, supra note 62, at 63 (prepared statement of John
Stephenson). These Acts apply to facilities based on whether the facility houses a thresh-
old amount of a chemical. Facilities can opt to implement inherently safer technology by
changing the chemicals used or reducing the amount of the chemical at the facility. Id.
These are all voluntary measures that a facility could choose to take to be exempted from
the requirements of the Act, but are not required. See id.
104. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii) (2000).
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safety precautions, maintenance, monitoring, training measures, and an
emergency response plan.05
Although one interpretation of the Clean Air Act would give the EPA
proper authority to regulate so as to reduce vulnerability to terrorist
threats, the EPA has refused to interpret the Act in this way for fear of
litigation. 9 The Clean Air Act requires facilities to comply with certain
requirements based on accidental releases.Y0 7 An accidental release is
defined as "an unanticipated emission of a regulated substance or other
extremely hazardous substance into the ambient air from a stationary
source."' 08 If an unanticipated emission could be interpreted to include a
terrorist attack, then the EPA would have authority over all facilities and
could require vulnerability assessments and security response plans with
regards to the threat of such an attack' 09
The EPA also requires those facilities processing, handling, or storing a
certain quantity of a chemical to conduct a hazard assessment that in-
cludes identifying possible accidental releases and providing an emer-
gency response when there is a release."0 The EPA could require these
facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments as part of the hazard as-
sessment under the same interpretation of an "accidental release... 1 The
EPA, however, has taken the position that "chemical facility security
would be more effectively addressed by passage of specific legislation."" 2
Additionally, the EPA's regulations implementing the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act of 1976 require facilities housing hazardous
waste to post warning signs, have controlled entry gates, and conduct
twenty-four hour surveillance."' However, this Act covers only twenty-
one percent of the 15,000 facilities in the chemical sector."4 The short-
105. Id.
106. Chemical Plant Security Hearing, supra note 62, at 63-64 (prepared statement of
John Stephenson).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (2006).
108. Id.
109. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOMELAND SECURITY: VOLUNTARY
INITIATIVES ARE UNDER WAY AT CHEMICAL FACILITIES, BUT THE EXTENT OF
SECURITY PREPAREDNESS IS UNKNOWN 16 (2003) [hereinafter VOLUNTARY
INITIATIVES]. For example, if a terrorist attacked a facility, that attack would result in an
unanticipated emission and would technically qualify under the EPA's definition of acci-
dental release, and the facility would therefore be required to comply with Clean Air Act
requirements.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii).
111. VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES, supra note 109, at 16.
112. Id. The EPA's position is that a terrorist attack would be considered an inten-
tional release, and would therefore fall outside the scope of EPA's authority to regulate
against accidental releases. Id. at 17-18.
113. 40 C.F.R. § 264.14(b)-(c) (2007).
114. Chemical Plant Security Hearing, supra note 62, at 62 (prepared statement of John
Stephenson).
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comings of the EPA's approach to chemical facility security and of other
federal legislation addressing the subject do little to protect our nation
from chemical terrorism. A call for a more expansive federal role is of
the utmost urgency.
IV. CURRENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION BEFORE THE HOUSE AND
SENATE
The 109th Congress considered a number of bills addressing chemical
facility security. One such bill, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act,
was introduced in the Senate on December 19, 2005."' Its companion bill
was introduced in the House on June 28, 2006.116 Both bills delegate to
DHS the task of establishing risk-based criteria for determining which
facilities are at a greater risk of terrorist infiltration."7 Further, under the
proposed legislation, DHS would establish security standards for such
high-risk facilities."' Facilities are placed into risk-based tiers by consid-
ering various factors, such as proximity to population centers, 9 impact
on national security,"2° and likelihood of death or injury caused by a ter-
rorist attack.' Prior bills considered only those facilities requiring sub-
mission of a risk management plan to the EPA under the Clean Air
Act.'22 Facilities covered under the Clean Air Act are those that are
"producing, processing, holding, or storing [extremely hazardous] sub-
stances."' 23 Conversely, the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Act al-
lows DHS to require additional facilities to comply with the standards of
the Act if the facility is of critical economic importance or if it contains
threshold amounts of hazardous chemicals that are not on the risk man-
agement plan list.' 24 This authorizes DHS to require facilities then not
115. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005, S. 2145, 109th Cong. (2005).
116. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, H.R. 5695, 109th Cong. (2006).
117. See S. 2145 § 2(3); H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (amending the Homeland Security Act of
2002).
118. S. 2145 § 4; H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1802(b)(3)).
119. S. 2145, § 3(b)(5).
120. S. 2145, § 3(b)(3); H.R. 5695, § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1802(b)(3)(E)).
121. S. 2145, § 3(b)(2); H.R. 5695, § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. 1802(b)(3)(B)).
122. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1) (2000); see also DHS is TAKING STEPs, supra note 66, at 9.
A threshold amount is determined by "taking into account the toxicity, reactivity, volatil-
ity, dispersibility, combustibility, or flammability of the substance and the amount of the
substance which, as a result of an accidental release, is known to cause or may reasonably
be anticipated to cause death, injury or serious adverse effects to human health." 42
U.S.C. § 7412(r)(5). For example, a facility that uses or stores 2500 pounds of chlorine is
subject to the accidental release prevention requirements of the Clean Air Act. 40 C.F.R. §
68.130 (2006).
124. See S. 2145 § 3(c); H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1802(b)(3)).
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covered under the Clean Air Act to comply with enhanced security re-
quirements.
Under the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Act, as in previous bills,
facilities are also required to conduct vulnerability assessments'25 that
must address weaknesses in physical security, communication systems,
and electronic systems.126 Security plans must be coordinated with local
first responders 27 and should include training and unannounced drills.'2
After each facility conducts a vulnerability assessment, the facility must
develop site security plans to address those vulnerabilities.'9
The bill proposes chemical site security from both risk-based and per-
formance-based approaches.130 A risk-based approach attempts to make
security measures at a facility proportional to the threat or consequences
of a terrorist attack,' while performance-based standards are security
measures set by DHS.32 These performance standards are needed to set
strict security requirements at each risk-based tier level. For each tier,
DHS determines threats against which the facility must be able to de-
fend.'34 The bill allows facilities to choose their own method of address-
ing the risks, as long as the methods achieve the standards established by
DHS.33
More specifically, the Senate bill subjects all facilities that are already
governed by the MTSA to the bill's security provisions. 36 These facilities
must submit plans currently submitted under MTSA to DHS, along with
any modifications that are needed to comply with the security standards
established by the Secretary of DHS under the Chemical Facility Anti-
125. S. 2145 § 4(a)(1)(A); H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1)(A)(ii)).
126. S. 2145 § 4(a)(5)(D)(i)-(iii); H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1803(b)(1)(E)).
127. S. 2145 §§ 4(a)(6)(F), 6(e)(2); H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. §
1803(b)(2)(B)).
128. S. 2145 § 6(e)(1); H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1803(b)(2)(B)). The
House bill requires additional drills referred to as "red team exercises." H.R. 5695 § 2(a)
(proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1803(b)(4)). Drills are designed to expose vulnerabilities and weak-
nesses in security plans. Id.; see also Ben Geman, House Markup Continues Today with
Key Votes on Tap, ENv'T & ENERGY DAILY, July 28, 2006. All high-risk chemical facili-
ties are required to undergo a mock attack within six years. Geman, supra. If plan does
not address vulnerabilities identified in the mock attack, then DHS must not approve the
security plan. Id.
129. S. 2145 § 4(a)(1)(A)-(B); H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. §
1803(a)(1)(A)(ii)).
130. S. 2145 § 4(a)(2)(A); H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(2)).
131. See S. 2145 § 3(b),(e).
132. Id. § 3(f)(1).
133. Id. § 3(f)(2)(A). The bill does not specifically delineate how the Secretary is to
determine standards. See id. § 3(f).
134. See id. § 3(f)(2)(A).
135. Id. § 3(f)(3)(B); cf. H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1803(e)(2)) (providing
that the Secretary "may endorse" such methods at his discretion).
136. S. 2145 § 4(e)(1).
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Terrorism Act. 37 The House bill, however, exempts those facilities sub-
ject to other statutes, such as the MTSA or the Safe Drinking Water
Act. 8 Although these facilities are required to submit their current plans
to DHS, they are not required to make any changes unless the Secretary
of DHS determines that stricter security measures are needed.39
In addition to the civil and administrative fines for noncompliance con-
tained in both the House and Senate bills,14° the Senate bill also author-
izes the Secretary of DHS to shut down facilities that the Secretary be-
lieves have not appropriately addressed the risk of a terrorist threat.1
4
Under both bills, criminal charges may also result for a knowing violation
of an order or site security plan.42
Although most of the provisions in the legislation before each house of
Congress are similar and unopposed, the lack of a preemption clause in
the Senate version and the provisions in the House version proscribing
the implementation of inherently safer technology are highly controver-
sial.
A. Preemption
The current House bill allows states to make more stringent standards,
as long as those standards do not "frustrate" the purpose of the federal
legislation. 43 Any state questioning whether its law is preempted by the
proposed Act would be required to submit an application to the Secre-
tary of DHS for review.1 " Critics of the House bill fear that this languagetary f DHS •144
will have the same effect as preemption.
Conversely, the Senate bill expressly provides that state laws on chemi-
cal security are not preempted. 46 Congress has been cautious about pre-
137. Id. § 4(3)(2)(A).
138. H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1803(f)(1)).
139. Id.
140. S. 2145 § 8(a)-(b); H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1806(a)-(b)).
141. S. 2145 § 4(c)(3)(A)(iv).
142. Id. § 8(c); H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1806(c)).
143. H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1807(a)); see also Anthony Lacey, Industry
Eyes Barton to Stall Security Bill Ahead of 9/11 Anniversary, WATER POL'Y REP., Aug. 7,
2006, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WATRPT File.
144. H.R. 5695 § 2(a) (proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1807(b)).
145. Ben Geman, House Bill Coasts Through Markup with State Preemption Intact,
ENV'T & ENERGY DAILY, July 12, 2006, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, EENEWS
File.
146. See S. 2145 § 10(a) (providing that state laws are not preempted so long as they set
"more stringent" standards than, and do not create "an actual conflict" with, the federal
law); see also Geman, supra note 145. An early draft of the bill contained a broadly-
applicable preemption clause, mandating that "'a law, regulation, order, or other require-
ment of a State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe relating to the security of
chemical sources against terrorist attack that is not substantively the same as of [sic] provi-
sion of this Act is preempted."' U.S. Chemical Security Bill Will Not Pre-empt States,
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emption because of states' rights issues and a fear that the legislation will
be overturned by the courts.1 47 On the other hand, fourteen Senators
have argued that the bill must be amended to preempt states from setting
more stringent standards.149 Senator George Voinovich proposed an
amendment to the Senate bill that would allow federal law to preempt
state legislation. 49 Senator Lieberman opposed the amendment, noting
that many states have already moved to increase security at chemical fa-
cilities. " °
The most vocal advocate for a preemption clause is the chemical indus-
try itself. The president of the National Petrochemical & Refiners Asso-
ciation has said that "allowing states to 'impose competing regulatory
requirements risks creating a confusing "patchwork" of regulations that
will also impede facility security protection efforts.""'' . Others advocate
that if the proposed legislation does not include a preemption clause,
communities could become more vulnerable to attacks due to a lack of a
centralized, cohesive, and understandable system for chemical security.
1 2
The industry suggests that the legislation should go further in addressing
federal preemption so that every chemical facility is required to meet the• • 153
same standards and make the same investments. They recommend a
preemption provision similar to the one in the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act, which preempts state requirements unless they are
substantively the same as the federal program. Diverse and often en-
CHEMICAL NEWS & INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 13, 2005, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CNI File.
147. Mayberry & Franken, supra note 12. The Tenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved for the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
148. Lacey, supra note 143; New Hurdles Raised for Already-Delayed Chemical Secu-
rity Bill, ENV'TL POL'Y ALERT, July 19, 2006, at 20 [hereinafter New Hurdles Raised].
149. Chemical Sites Still Subject to State Regulation, FINANCIALWIRE, June 16, 2006,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INVEST File.
150. Id.
151. Lacey, supra note 143; see also Joe Kamalick, U.S. Chems Face Lose-Lose Deal on
Plant Security, CHEMICAL NEWS & INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 15, 2005, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CNI File (reporting that industry officials view federal preemption as essen-
tial).
152. See New Hurdles Raised, supra note 148.
153. See Major U.S. Producers Welcome Plant Site Security Bill, CHEMICAL NEWS &
INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 5, 2005, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNI File.
154. See Chemical Facility Security: What is the Appropriate Federal Role?: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 9-11
(2005) [hereinafter Chemical Facility Security Hearings] (testimony of Martin J. Durbin,
Managing Director, Security and Operations, American Chemistry Council); 49 U.S.C.A. §
5125(b) (West Supp. 2007) ("(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section and
unless authorized by another law of the United States, a law, regulation, order, or other
requirement of a State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe about any of the
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tirely inadequate state legislation places tremendous burdens on the
chemical industry and does little to alleviate the threat of chemical terror-
ism. A unified system, which can only come through federal preemption,
is necessary to properly monitor chemical security.
B. Inherently Safer Technologies
Inherently safer technology (IST) should be utilized as another security
measure in the arsenal against terrorist attacks on chemical facilities.
Although fences, guards, background checks, and vulnerability assess-
ments provide increased security, these methods alone are insufficient."'
Inherently safer technology was defined in the proposed Chemical Secu-
rity Act of 2001 as the:
use of a technology, product, raw material, or practice that, as
compared with the technologies, products, raw materials, or prac-
tices currently in use (i) reduces or eliminates the possibility of a
release of a substance of concern from the chemical source prior
to secondary containment, control, or mitigation; and (ii) reduces
or eliminates the threats to public health and the environment as-
following subjects, that is not substantively the same as a provision of this chapter, a regu-
lation prescribed under this chapter, or a hazardous materials transportation security regu-
lation or directive issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security, is preempted:(A) the
designation, description, and classification of hazardous material. (B) the packing, repack-
ing, handling, labeling, marking, and placarding of hazardous material. (C) the prepara-
tion, execution, and use of shipping documents related to hazardous material and require-
ments related to the number, contents, and placement of those documents. (D) the written
notification, recording, and reporting of the unintentional release in transportation of
hazardous material. (E) the designing, manufacturing, fabricating, inspecting, marking,
maintaining, reconditioning, repairing, or testing a package, container, or packaging com-
ponent that is represented, marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in transporting
hazardous material in commerce. (2) If the Secretary of Transportation prescribes or has
prescribed under section 5103(b), 5104, 5110, or 5112 of this title or prior comparable pro-
vision of law a regulation or standard related to a subject referred to in paragraph (1) of
this subsection, a State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe may prescribe, issue,
maintain, and enforce only a law, regulation, standard, or order about the subject that is
substantively the same as a provision of this chapter or a regulation prescribed or order
issued under this chapter. The Secretary shall decide on and publish in the Federal Regis-
ter the effective date of section 5103(b) of this title for any regulation or standard about
any of those subjects that the Secretary prescribes .... the effective date may not be ear-
lier than 90 days after the Secretary prescribes the regulation or standard nor later than the
last day of the 2-year period beginning on the date the Secretary prescribes the regulation
or standard. (3) If a State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe imposes a fine or
penalty the Secretary decides is appropriate for a violation related to a subject referred to
in paragraph (1) of this subsection, an additional fine or penalty may not be imposed by
any other authority.").
155. See FLYNN, supra note 1, at 69 (criticizing the "silver-bullet approach" to security,
and arguing in favor of a multi-layer approach).
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sociated with a release or potential release of a substance of con-
cern from the chemical source.1
5 6
In November 2001, at a Sterling Chemicals, Inc. plant, police officers
tested chemical security by dressing in "frogmen suits" and infiltrating
the facility by slipping through a channel nearby.57 The facility, which
manufactured a number of hazardous chemicals, had recently increased
security by adding watchtowers, security cameras, concrete barricades,
and guards."' The police commented that the new security measures
made it "harder to get in," but "had not kept them out."'5 9 Thus, good
fences may make good neighbors, but, alone, they do not make sufficient
chemical security. Inherently safer technology must be included in the
overall security plan. Previously proposed bills have recognized that in-
herently safer technology can be implemented through a number of
methods.'9
Proponents of requiring the implementation of inherently safer tech-
nologies assert that reducing the levels of hazardous materials will make
facilities less attractive terrorist targets and will reduce the effects of such
an attack by reducing the risks associated with spills and releases of haz-
ardous chemicals.6 Conversely, those who oppose implementation of
IST programs assert that the beneficial effects of IST are unproven.162
They add that the main effect is to shift the risk from a stationary chemi-
cal plant to the nations' highways and railways. Further, a director of
the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA)
has argued that any provision requiring the use of inherently safer tech-
nology could "'lead to government micromanagement of technical deci-
156. S. 1602, 107th Cong. § 3(9)(A) (2001).
157. Sharon Begley, Protecting America, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 26, 33.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. E.g., S. 1602 § 2(3)(A)(i)-(ii); Chemical Security Act of 2003, S. 157, 108th Cong. §
2(4)(A) (2003). The four primary methods to implement inherently safer technology are
substitution, intensification, moderation, and simplification. James Beebe, Comment,
Inherently Safer Technology: The Cure for Chemical Plants which are Dangerous by De-
sign, 28 Hous. J. INT'L L. 239, 257 (2006). Substitution simply replaces the more hazard-
ous chemical with a safer chemical. Id. at 260. Water treatment facilities have employed
substitution by replacing their use of chlorine gas, a hazardous chemical that if released
travels quickly and affects lung capacity, with liquid sodium hypochlorite. See id. at 261.
Intensification entails reducing the quantity of hazardous chemicals used in a particular
process. Id. at 258-59. Moderation involves changing the actual processing or storage of
chemicals, such as by lowering pressure or temperature. Id. at 261. Simplification en-
hances safety in chemical manufacturing by reducing the number of steps or chemical
reactions in the process. Id. at 262.
161. Chemical Plant Security Hearing, supra note 62, at 67; Lacey, supra note 143.
162. Lacey, supra note 143; Anthony Lacey, House Vote Renews Debate on 'Safe'
Chemical Practices, States' Rights, ENV'TL POL'Y ALERT, Aug. 2, 2006, at 30.
163. See Chemical Plant Security Hearing, supra note 62, at 67.
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sions that chemists and engineers are making on a daily basis at chemical
facilities.'"164
The version of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006 that
passed in the House contains an amendment requiring only high-risk fa-
cilities (determined by Clean Air Act standards) to consider using IST6
The amended Act essentially provides that "DHS can require the high-
risk facilities to use IST if the agency can prove it will significantly reduce
the consequences of a terrorist attack; can feasibly be incorporated into a
facility; and will not significantly impair the ability of a facility owner to
continue in business."'6 The amendment also allows facilities to appeal
the agency's decision to use IST.1 67 Appeals are submitted to a chemical
security review board called the "Panel on Methods to Reduce the Con-
sequences of a Terrorist Attack."' 68 The panel's members, selected by
DHS from other state and federal agencies, would assess the feasibility of
a facility to comply with IST security measures and may offer recommen-
dations to help the facility assess and implement ISW.69
The amendment further includes an enforcement provision that gives
the Secretary of DHS power to require a facility to implement IST.170 In
addition to the explicit provisions regarding IST, Representative Loretta
Sanchez noted that a tier-based approach, as contained in the bill, would
encourage facilities to become inherently safer because lower-risk tiers
require fewer security measures.
71
IST implementation, however, has already met with some success. One
example of how inherently safer technology can be effectively imple-
mented at a modest cost is found at the Blue Plains Sewage Treatment
Plant in Washington, D.C.172 Prior to September 11th, 2001, the facility
164. Larry Pearl, Federal Chemical Security Bill Lacks Mandate for Safer Technology,
PESTICIDE & ToxIc CHEMICAL NEWS, Jan. 2. 2006, at 1, 25.
165. Lacey, supra note 143. The approved amendment resulted from a compromise on
a prior version of the amendment that required all facilities to implement inherently safer
technologies. Lacey, supra note 162.
166. Lacey, supra note 143.
167. Lacey, supra note 162.
168. Ben Geman, Inherently Safer Tech Language Tucked Into House Bill, ENV'T &
ENERGY DAILY, July 31, 2006.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Loretta Sanchez, How Should Congress Ensure the Security of the United States
Chemical Plants?: Chemical Security Legislation Needed, ROLL CALL, Sept. 25, 2006,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ROLLCL File. Under the proposed legislation, chemi-
cal facilities are classified into various levels or tiers based on the risk the facility would
pose. High-risk facilities, or those for which a chemical release or terrorist incident would
affect a large number of people, must meet more stringent requirements and are watched
more closely for compliance. See text accompanying notes 117-21, 124.
172. Prepared Statement of Senator Jon S. Corzine to the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Apr. 27, 2005, at 5-6, available at
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housed 550 tons of chlorine and sulfur dioxide, both volatile chemicals
that could cover the city with a poisonous cloud if released.173 After Sep-
tember 11th, the facility replaced the chlorine with sodium hypochlo-
174 of175rite, at a cost of only twenty-five to fifty cents a year per household.
Additionally, a report produced by the Center for American Progress
documents how 284 facilities have implemented IST.176 The report notes
that half of the facilities that implemented IST spent less than $100,000.1
7
1
Water treatment facilities substituted liquid chlorine or ultraviolet light
for chlorine gas, while facilities manufacturing food products substituted
sodium bisulfate for sulfur dioxide. Such changes reduce the use of
volatile chemicals, alleviating the temptation for a terrorist attack.
The Senate version of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of
2006 does not require the implementation of inherently safer technol-179
ogy. Senator Susan Collins did not include inherently safer technology
in the bill because, in her view, Congress should not "'dictate specific
industrial processes.''8° Senator Collins seems to be endorsing the views
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/CorzineHSGACtestimony.pdf [hereinafter Corzine prepared
statement]; see also Chemical Attack Hearing, supra note 17, at 12 (testimony of Sen. John
Corzine).
173. Corzine prepared statement, supra note 172, at 6; see also Chemical Attack Hear-
ing, supra note 17, at 12 (testimony of Sen. John Corzine). Chlorine is "[t]oxic by inhala-
tion, ingestion and through skin contact. Inhalation can cause serious lung damage and
may be fatal" after only a few breaths depending on the concentration. Physical & Theo-
retical Chemistry Lab, Chemical Safety Data: Chlorine, http://ptcl.chem.ox.ac.uk/-hmc/
hsci/chemicals/chlorine.html (last visited July 21, 2007).
174. Corzine prepared statement, supra note 172, at 6; see also Chemical Attack Hear-
ing, supra note 17, at 12 (testimony of Sen. John Corzine). Sodium hypochlorite is only
toxic if mixed with an acid. Physical & Theoretical Chemistry Lab, Chemical Safety Data:
Sodium Hypochlorite Solution, http://ptcl.chem.ox.ac.uk/-hmc/hsci/chemicals/sodium
hypochlorite.html (last visited July 21, 2007).
175. Chemical Attack Hearing, supra note 17, at 52 (prepared statement of Sen. John
Corzine).
176. PAUL ORUM, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, PREVENTING Toxic
TERRORISM 7-9 (2006), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2006/04/
b681085_ct2556757.html/chem survey.pdf; see also Larry Pearl, Report Says Using Safer
Chemicals, Processes Can Save Money, PESTICIDE & ToxIC CHEMICAL NEWS, May 1,
2006, at 16, 16-17.
177. ORUM, supra note 176, at 8; see also Kara Sissell, Survey Details Plants' Effort to
Switch to Safer Processes, CHEMICAL WK., May 3, 2006.
178. ORUM, supra note 176, at 10, 13-14; see also Sissell, supra note 177. Sulfur dioxide
is a colorless gas that can irritate and burn the skin, causing damage to both the throat and
eyes. New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, Hazardous Substance Fact
Sheet, available at http://nj.gov/health/eoh/rtkweb/documents/fs/1759.pdf.
179. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005, S. 2145, 109th Cong. §
2(10)(B)(vii). The bill does not require IST to be implemented, nor is an assessment nec-
essary to evaluate the use of IST. See generally id.; see also Pearl, supra note 164.
180. Chemical Security Bill Filed in U.S. Senate, CHEMICAL NEWS & INTELLIGENCE,
Dec. 19,2005, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNI File.
1192 [Vol. 56:1171
Chemical Homeland Security, Fact or Fiction?
of the ACC. According to the ACC, although there have been some suc-
cesses with the implementation of IST, the "government's role is not to
make business decisions.' 8' Emphasizing the scale of the problem, the
ACC stated that "the Department of Homeland Security can never hope
to be equipped to make educated decisions about the impact of internal
process changes on the safety and security of 15,000 facilities ....
Many scientists and lobbyists for the chemical facilities do not share the
ACC's and Senator Collins' skepticism of IST. Commentators in the
chemical industry offer various proposals to encourage the implementa-
tion of inherently safer technology, including tax incentives and tax disin-
centives. 3 One commentator advocates a tax disincentive by applying an
excise tax to hazardous chemicals. 184 The increase in the cost of hazard-
ous materials would be used in an attempt to balance the overall cost
effect of using inherently safer chemicals.' He proposes that even if
facilities choose to pay the increased cost and continue to use hazardous
chemicals, they may resort to a just-in-time system to cope with the addi-
tional costs.' 86 This system will lower the amount of chemicals on-site
and, therefore, the overall threat of the facility.' A tax incentive of a
dollar for dollar credit on tax liability for investments in inherently safer
technology is also recommended.'9
V. CURRENT STATE LEGISLATION
Northern New Jersey is home to "the most dangerous two miles in
America." ' 89 The region has six chemical plants that could endanger over
181. Sissell, supra note 177, at 28.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 160, at 272-76.
184. Id. at 273-75.
185. Id. at 273-74.
186. Id. at 275. Just-in-time systems apply "'the idea of producing the necessary units
in the necessary quantities at the necessary time."' Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity,
and Coevolution: The Web of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the
Millennium, 65 TENN. L. REV. 925, 977-78 (1998). In other words, a chemical facility
would use the necessary amount of the dangerous chemical at a particular stage in the
process, leading to little to no storage time of a chemical and therefore reduced amounts of
the chemical on site.
187. Beebe, supra note 160, at 275.
188. Id. at 276.
189. Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Schumer Blasts DHS for Dragging its
Feet on Chemical Plant Security (August 24, 2006), available at http://www.senate.
gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/schumeraround-ny/record.cfm?id=262092&. Senator
Corzine of New Jersey noted that 12 million people in the surrounding area could be af-
fected if a cloud of gas from a chemical plant just across the Hudson River from New York
City released its one thousand tons of chlorine gas. U.S. Plants: Open to Terrorists, supra
note 35.
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one million people.' 9° The New Jersey Environmental Council reported
that just one incident at a single plant alone in New Jersey could affect up
to twelve million people within a fourteen mile radius.191
Following September 11th, 2001, the New Jersey state government cre-
ated a task force within the state's Department of Homeland Security to
develop programs of domestic preparedness and guidelines to protect its
critical infrastructure.'92 In November 2005, following years of hearings
with advisory committees, which consisted of industry representatives
from the ACC and SOCMA, New Jersey became the first and only state
to issue mandatory standards for chemical facilities.193
These standards address the same requirements currently under debate
in the proposed federal legislation. The Best Practices Standards require
all chemical facilities covered T9 to conduct facility vulnerability assess-
ments. 195 These assessments must be conducted by an expert approved by
the American Institute of Chemical Engineers' Center for Chemical
Process Safety.1 96 In addition, all facilities must develop a prevention and
response plan that must address any issues revealed by the vulnerability
assessment or identified by employees.' 97 Those facilities that are also
covered by the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act19s must make an as-
190. Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, supra note 189 (referring to a GAO
Report that included this statistic). The Congressional Research service has sited that
there are seven chemical facilities with these possible effects. Memorandum from Dana A.
Shea, Analyst in Sci. & Tech. Policy, Res., Sci., & Indus. Div., Cong. Research Serv. To
Hon. Edward Markey, at 4 tbl. 1. (Jun. 27, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/homesec/rmp062705.pdf.
191. Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, supra note 189.
192. Richard F. Ricci & Neil A. Feldscher, New Jersey Takes the Lead on Chemical
Plant Security, N.J.L.J., Feb. 6, 2006, at 1, 1.
193. Id. at 2; Magnuson, supra note 26.
194. Chemical facilities that produce, handle, use, or store chemical, rubber, or plastic
products and currently fall under the Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act or the Discharge
Prevention, Containment and Countermeasure Program must comply with the Best Prac-
tices Standards. BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS AT TCPA/DPCC CHEMICAL SECTOR
FACILITIES § 1 (2005) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS]; see also Ricci & Feld-
scher, supra note 192, at 2.
195. BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS § 2; see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192, at
2. The seventy-two facilities that are members of the Chemistry Council of New Jersey
already comply with this standard. Lois Ember, New Jersey Mandates Chemical Plant
Security, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Dec. 5, 2005, at 13, available at
http://pubs.acs.org/cen/news/83/i49/8349notw9.html.
196. BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS § 2; see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192, at
2.
197. BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS § 3; see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192, at
2.
198. N.J. REV. STAT § 13:1K-20 (2003) (facilities covered by the TCPA are those that
"generate, store, handle, and transport" threshold quantities of extremely hazardous sub-
stances); see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192, at 2.
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sessment of the practicability of adopting inherently safer technology. 9
If the facility determines that IST measures are impractical, then the fa-
cility must justify their findings. °"
The Chemistry Council of New Jersey, however, opposes the imple-
mentation of inherently safer technology, stating that its requirements
have "little to do with security."20' Another spokesman suggested that
requiring inherently safer technology would only move the danger from
isolated chemical plant facilities to the highways because facilities will
require more frequent shipments of chemicals. 2
The standards also include various measures addressing the need to re-
port security breaches.203 Most information and documentation prepared
in accordance with the Best Practices Standards is kept confidential un-
20
der the Domestic Security Preparedness Act. 04 Unlike the proposed fed-
eral legislation, the New Jersey standards do not include a strict enforce-
ment clause.20 5 Under the state's Domestic Security Preparedness Act,
though, the Attorney General may file suit against chemical companies
that knowingly refuse to comply with the standards. 206 The court may
then grant equitable relief "if necessary to preserve, protect, or sustain
the public safety or well-being. '" 20 In essence, facilities can continue to
operate dangerously at a lower cost, by just paying fines.
In 2004, Maryland enacted legislation affecting all facilities that store,
dispense, use or handle hazardous materials. 2 ' The Hazardous Material
Security Act focuses on security measures based on risk 
levels, 9
199. BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS § 5; see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192, at
2; supra Part IV.B (discussing the various possible IST measures).
200. BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS § 5; see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192, at
2.
201. Ember, supra note 195, at 13.
202. Karen Keller, N.J. Orders Chemical Safeguards; Codey Says State is First to Im-
pose Such Rules, HERALD NEWS(Passaic County, N.J.), Nov. 30, 2005.
203. BEST PRACrICES STANDARDS § 7; see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192, at
2.
204. BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS § 12; see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192, at
2.
205. Compare BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS with Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Act of 2005, S. 2145, 109th Cong. § 4(c)(3)(A)(iv) (2005) (as discussed, the newly proposed
federal legislation authorizes the Secretary of DHS to shut down facilities that the Secre-
tary believes have not appropriately addressed the risk of a terrorist threat); see also Ricci
& Feldscher, supra note 192, at 3.
206. N.J. REv. STAT. § App. A:9-73 (2006); see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192,
at 3.
207. N.J. REV. STAT. § App. A:9-73 (2006); see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192,
at 3.
208. Hazardous Material Security Act, 2004 Md. Laws 2374.
209. MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 7-703(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006).
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emphasizes- training,21 and promotes information sharing.2 Each facility
is required to complete a vulnerability assessment. Third-party' verifi-
cation is required to ensure that vulnerabilities have been adequately
identified.213 The Act requires that all the information generated remain
214confidential . All violations are handled through the Maryland De-
partment of State Police,215 and violations may result in civil penalties not
exceeding $1000 per violation. 6 Facilities that are subjected to more
stringent standards by local jurisdiction are not required to meet the
standards of the Act. 7
Also in 2004, the State of New York enacted the Anti-Terrorism Pre-
paredness Act.21 8 This act gave the state's Office of Homeland Security
219authority over New York's critical infrastructure. Within six months of
enactment, the Director of the New York Office of Homeland Security
was required to promulgate a list of toxic or hazardous substances.
22°
After the creation of this list, the' director would then identify those facili-
ties housing substances that could harm the public if released.2 2' Each
identified facility would then be required to conduct a vulnerability as-
sessment and submit it to the director, who would review the assessment
and make recommendations on how to increase security.2
VI. THE HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 2007
On October 4, 2006, the President signed the Homeland Security Ap-
propriations Act for 2007.223 The Act included one short section regard-
ing chemical facility security that requires DHS to establish regulations
providing risk-based performance standards for those facilities that pre-
sent a high level of risk.2 4 Those facilities are then required to conduct
210. Id. § 7-703(4).
211. Id. § 7-703(5).
212. Id. § 7-702(c)(2).
213. Id. § 7-703(7).
214. Id. § 7-702(f).
215. Id. § 7-704(b).
216. Id. § 7-708(a).
217. Id. § 7-702(b).
218. Anti-Terrorism Preparedness Act, 2004 N.Y. Laws 1, 15; see also DHS is TAKING
STEPS, supra note 66, at 12.
219. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 714 (McKinney 2005).
220. Id. § 714(2)(a).
221. Id. § 714(2)(b).
222. Id. § 714(2)(c).
223. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
295, 120 Stat. 1355; see also Press Release, White House, President's Statement on H.R.
5441, the "Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007" (Oct. 4, 2006),
available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061004-10.html.
224. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 § 550(a).
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vulnerability assessments and develop and implement site security
plans.22 The Act only grants DHS three years to regulate parts of the
221chemical industry covered by the Act.
Although the new law provides some stricter requirements for chemical
facilities, the law leaves gaps and does not include any of the controver-
sial parts of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, as re-
227ported in either the House or the Senate. The shortened legislation
does not provide instruction for DHS, which must now create a "list of
covered chemicals, a definition for 'high level of security risk,' and the
required contents for acceptable security plans," 22 all of which are agreed
on in a comparative analysis of both the House and Senate proposed leg-
islation. The chemical industry previously commented that the lan-
guage of this section created uncertainty as to whether a facility would be
covered.2 30
These missing pieces must be filled by the DHS rulemaking proce-
dures, and interested parties, including those companies within the
chemical industry, must be given advance notice and an opportunity to
comment on any proposed rules and as required by the Administrative
Procedure Act.231 DHS must promulgate regulations within six months
232after the Act is passed .
DHS, however, is not known for its promptness. In December of 2003,
the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, requir-
ing the Department to release the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan by 2004.233 The Plan was released in its final format on June 30,
2006, almost two years late.234 Given the provisions of the Administrative
225. Id.
226. Id. § 550(b).
227. Compare id. § 550, with H.R. REP. No. 109-707 (2006), and S. REP. NO. 109-332
(2006); see also discussion supra Part IV.
228. Katherine E. Lazarski & Richard G. Stoll, Legislation Requires New Security
Rules for Chemical Plants, MONDAQ, Nov. 1, 2006, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
articleid=43694&searchresults=l.
229. See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005, S. 2145, 109th Cong. (2005);
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, H.R. 5695, 109th Cong. (2006).
230. Byrd's Security Plan Draws Concern Over Threshold for Regulation, SUPERFUND
REP., July 31, 2006, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SUFRPT File [hereinafter Byrd's
Security Plan].
231. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); see also Lazarski & Stoll, supra note 228.
232. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-
295 § 550(a), 120 Stat. 1355, 1388 (2006).
233. Press Release, White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd 7
(Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-
5.html.
234. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Completes National In-
frastructure Protection Plan (Jun. 30, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/
releases/pressrelease_0940.shtm; see also REP. BENNIE G. THOMPSON, DEMOCRATIC
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Procedure Act requiring an opportunity to comment, drafting these pro-
visions within six months seems unlikely.f5
The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 does not address
inherently safer technology or preemption of state and local laws.236
Many in the industry are concerned that the legislation is over-broad and
gives too much discretion to DHS in determining preemption and IST
requirements.3 7  Senators Frank R. Lautenburg and Barack Obama
noted that one of the main problems with the Appropriations Act is that
there is "no clear statement that states retain the authority to adopt
stronger chemical security measures than what is adopted at the federal
level., 238 They also observed that "DHS is prohibited from requiring any
specific technology or security measure from being adopted."' 9
Additionally, the law covers fewer facilities than those covered under
either the House or the Senate bill. The law exempts those facilities al-
ready covered by the Maritime Transportation Security Act,240 the Safe
STAFF OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, THE STATE OF HOMELAND
SECURITY 2006 46, 51 (2006), available at http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/
20060814122421-06109.pdf.
235. In late December 2006, DHS released a proposed interim rule to regulate chemi-
cal facilities with comments due in early February. Information Regarding Security Risk
for a Chemical Facility, 72 Fed. Reg. 17690 (proposed Apr. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 6
CFR § 27.200); Press Release, Dept. of Homeland Security, DHS Introduces New Regula-
tions to Secure High-Risk Chemical Facilities (Dec. 22, 2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1166807052891.shtm. Over the comment period
there were over 140 recorded comments. The release of the proposed rule, which included
a preemption clause, but no mention of inherently safer technology, caused a stir in the
legislative and chemical community. See US Safety Rules Draw Industry Praise,
CHEMICAL NEWS & INTELLIGENCE, Dec. 26, 2006, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CNI File. After much pressure from various legislatures the interim final rule released
April 4, 2007 contained no preemption clause and no inherently safer technology. See NJ
May File Suit to Block US Site Security Regs, CHEMICAL NEWS & INTELLIGENCE, Mar. 20,
2007, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNI File. Since the release of the final interim
rule, in effect for 3 years, both Democrats and Republicans have begun proposing new
legislation to override the rules established by DHS. See Rep. Jackson-Lee Introduces
Chemical Facility Security Improvement Act, US FED NEWS, Mar. 26, 2007, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, USFDNW File; Democrats' Security Plan May Aid State Push For
'Safer' Technologies, INSIDE EPA, Mar. 23, 2007, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
INSEPA File.
236. See Press Release, Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg, Senate Dems: Republicans Selling
Out Nation on Chemical Plant Security (Sept. 27, 2006), available at http://liautenberg.
senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=263917; see also Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2007.
237. Byrd's Security Plan, supra note 230.
238. Press Release, Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg, supra note 236.
239. Id.
240. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 § 550(a). The
MTSA covers facilities 238 chemical facilities located on or near waterways. Under the
MTSA these facilities are required to conduct vulnerability assessments and prepare secu-
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Drinking Water Act,241 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 4  NuclearReguatoy Comision .. 241
Regulatory Commission regulations, or facilities owned or operated by
the Department of Energy or the Department of Defense.2" As previ-
ously discussed, the Senate version requires all facilities, including those
subject to the MTSA, to submit security plans and make modifications if
necessary.24 The House version exempted only those facilities covered
by the MTSA and the Safe Drinking Water Act.246 Therefore, the new
law applies to fewer facilities then either version of the Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Act proposed. It has been speculated that the number of
facilities that will be covered will be only 300 of the estimated 15,000 fa-
cilities.24
The Act provides for the imposition of civil penalties, as well as the
ability for the Secretary of Homeland Security to order a facility shut
down for noncompliance. 48 Before a facility may be shutdown, the Sec-
retary must provide the owner or operator with "a clear explanation of
deficiencies in the vulnerability assessment and site security plan," and
the facility must actually fail to comply with the order issued by the De-
241partment. Only after continued noncompliance can the Secretary order
a facility to cease operation2 ° Advocates for the chemical industry have
commented that these provisions may be too broad.5 '
rity plans in order to mitigate those vulnerabilities. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 70102-70104 (West
Supp. 2007); see also DHS IS TAKING STEPS, supra note 66, at 27.
241. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 § 550(a). The Safe
Drinking Water Act covers approximately 1900 facilities. These facilities service more than
3,300 people each. Facilities covered by the Safe Drinking Water Act are required to con-
duct vulnerability assessments and prepare emergency response plans. 42 U.S.C. 300i-
2(a)-(b) (2000); see also DHS is TAKING STEPS, supra note 66, at 47.
242. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 § 550(a). The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or the Clean Water Act, is aimed at keeping the
nation's waterways clean. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). The plan affects, among other
things, waste treatment facilities. Id. § 1281(b)-(e). The Act makes it unlawful to dis-
charge any chemical into navigable waters. Id. § 1311(a).
243. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 § 550(a). The
Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires nuclear facilities to utilize security measures
such as physical barriers near the reactor area, limited access to critical areas, and addi-
tional trained security. DHS IS TAKING STEPS, supra note 66, at 46-47.
244. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 § 550(a).
245. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005, S. 2145, 109th Cong. § 4(e)(2)
(2005).
246. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, H.R. 5695, 109th Cong. § 2(2)
(proposed 6 U.S.C. § 1803(0(1)) (2006).
247. Press Release, Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg, supra note 236.
248. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 § 550(d),(g).
249. Id. § 550(g).
250. Id.
251. Kara Sissell, Congress Reaches Deal on Chemical Security Law, CHEMICAL WK,
Oct. 4, 2006, at 9, 9.
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Representative Loretta Sanchez agreed with the basic concepts that
would be established by the Homeland Security Appropriations Act;
however, she urged that the appropriations bill should only be considered
a "stopgap measure," and additional efforts should be made to pass a
"comprehensive chemical plant security bill. ''2 2 Some activists feel that
the lack of facilities covered will lead to the passing of more comprehen-
sive legislation, while other activists feel that lawmakers will applaud
themselves on their efforts and abandon efforts to pass more comprehen-
sive legislation.53 The NPRA noted that the act will lead to changing
requirements within a few years because DHS is only granted authority
for a three year period.154 The industry argued that based on this sunset
provision, industry will be less likely to desire a long-term investment in
increasing security at facilities25
VII. A UNIFIED APPROACH
A unified approach is necessary to ensure the protection of critical in-
frastructure and the general population. In implementing a unified ap-
proach, the government must be willing to address the various excuses as
to why chemical facilities have not already implemented protections.
Corporate leaders in the chemical industry are concerned that if they
make improvements while other facilities remain idle, the less secured
facility will be attacked, leading to a government shutdown of the entire
industry.26 Their fears most likely result from the White House's re-
sponse to the airline industry following September 11th, 2001. Because
of attacks on two major airlines, the entire industry came to a grinding
halt.2 7 Industry leaders are also concerned that following an attack, legis-
latures will rush to pass requirements that affect the entire industry and
nullify the improvements that have already been made and the money
spent. 58 Comprehensive legislation is needed now to circumvent another
September 11th type reaction.
Another concern for CEOs is market share, because if they spend
money on voluntary initiatives then the cost of their services or products
will need to be increased. 5 9 They will lose market share to those facilities
252. Press Release, Loretta Sanchez, supra note 171.
253. Byrd's Security Plan, supra note 230.
254. NPRA Responds to Homeland Security Appropriations Language on Chemical
Facility Security, Bus. WIRE, Sept. 25, 2006, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE
file.
255. See id.
256. FLYNN, supra note 1, at 55-56.
257. See id. at 9-10.
258. Id. at 55-56.
259. Id. at 55.
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that do not make the additional investment.260 Facilities should be re-
quired to implement the necessary improvements based on the exposed
weaknesses determined by a vulnerability assessment.
Exposure to liability is another factor in a facility's willingness to par-
ticipate in vulnerability assessments. 261 These vulnerability assessments
are intended to highlight where additional security measures are needed,
therefore leaving facilities open to liability problems.262 Once chemical
facilities have conducted vulnerability assessments, they become aware of
the vulnerable areas in their security. If an attack were to occur and
these areas had not received increased security, then these facilities be-
come prime targets for lawsuits based on tort liability, because the facility
knew of the danger and did not take adequate steps to protect the public
from the harm that danger could cause. Unified legislation should con-
tain an immunity clause that would be available to those facilities that
take adequate measures to decrease security threats and damage that
could result from an intentional terrorist attack. Corporations need an
incentive to expose and address their vulnerabilities. Legislatures are
also slow to implement vulnerability assessments because "[t]o do so
would only add to the political liability risk, should the threat transpire
and the public discover that officials knew but failed to act.
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Unified legislation must address the conflicts that have plagued all
prior incarnations of proposed legislation, such as preemption and inher-
ently safer technology. This new legislation must include a clause that
preempts states from adopting their own legislation in order to have a
uniform system of protection. Although the states would be preempted,
the legislation should be strong and over-inclusive. Legislation such as
the current legislation in New Jersey is recommended, however, with a
few comments. The New Jersey legislation does not currently utilize a
strong enough enforcement method. Chemical facilities should not only
be subjected to substantial fines, but should also face complete shutdown
if vulnerable areas are not addressed. A high-risk facility that could be
subjected to attacks based on known risks should not be in operation. A
compliance division should be formed under the control of the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security to not only conduct random tests of facilities
at least twice a year, but also to hold hearings and hold facilities account-
able for violations of the new legislation.
The legislation adopted in New Jersey should also be used as an exam-
ple of how to deal with implementing inherently safer technology. As
contained in the New Jersey legislation, facilities should be required to
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make an assessment of the practicality of adopting inherently safer tech-
nology.264 If the facility determines that IST measures are not prctilal,
then the facility should be required to justify their findings to the compli-
ance board. The government should even consider tax incentives or dis-
incentives, as previously discussed. For some high-risk facilities, the gov-
ernment should appropriate funds to help defray any additional cost and
promote the use of inherently safer technology.
A unified approach is necessary for the protection of the critical infra-
structure and our nation as a whole. Politics must not stand in the way of
a safer America. Instead, the political bubble must burst in order to clear
the way for true legislative reform.
264. See BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS § 5; see also Ricci & Feldscher, supra note 192;
supra Part IV.B (discussing the various IST measures possible).
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